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A ‘Crew Manage the Operation’ concept was developed as a unifying
framework to analyse the combined role of diverse technologies in
supporting the management of peak workload and incapacitation.
Multiple-crew configurations mean that many of the same
technologies are supporting quite contrasting instantiation of crew
roles. While Proactive and Immediate modes support the
independence of the crew in their cockpit, both reactive modes of
workload management pose questions about the information flow
between the cockpit and ground control, and in turn about the level of
support or, in the final mode, effective intervention that could be
provided from the ground. These issues are not just about the flow of
information but about responsibility and accountability. Thus the
technologies are neither determinate of the way they are operated nor
are they bounded by cockpit environment; therefore a profound
discussion about crew roles and the philosophy of automation is
required.
New technologies on the flight deck are transforming the nature of automation to provide
novel solutions to core issues concerning human performance such as the management of
peak workload and pilot incapacitation. ACROSS was a large integrated European
project established with the goal of designing technology systems that alleviate crew
workload in current two-pilot operations to improve operational safety (ACROSS, 2016).
Three main objectives were set out to guide the design, development and testing of new
cockpit solutions: Objective 1 - Addressing peak workload situations; Objective 2 Addressing reduced crew operations; and Objective 3: Identifying open issues for
possible single-pilot operations. This paper simply outlines the development of concepts
concerning workload and automation through the project workprogramme. Other papers
will describe in more detail the methodologies used and present the analyses of results of
the various studies involved.
The Project comprised more than 30 partners spread across Europe, involving multiple
organisations, nationalities and large number of diverse technologies being developed in
parallel and tested and evaluated in a range of separate test beds. The technology work
packages were organised around the classic pillars: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate,
Manage Systems, with additional technology workpackages for Crew Monitoring and
Crew Incapacitation. Human Factors was one of several transverse workpackages
designed to provide a coherent integrated approach across the project. While the project
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was driven by the development of technologies, its core philosophy always emphasised
Human Factors as core to delivering its operational objectives.
In the absence of a physical integration of technologies at project level, the Human Factors team
had to deliver a conceptual framework to address the technology scope for each flight function as
well as their overall integrated assessment. The objective was to deliver an integrated concept of
the crew and their activity with technology at three levels: 1) the operational process, 2) crew
tasks, and 3) Human-Machine-Interface. the challenge was to manage the integration of human
factors throughout the project ensuring the achievement of operationally valid solutions.
The Initial Workshop
The first Human Factors workshop to address the global operational level was attended
Technology development leads, HF experts and the operational representatives in the project. A
core purpose was to ask Technology development leaders to link the contribution of their
technology to the crew maintenance of the Situational Awareness (SA) bubble. SA refers to the
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future (Endsley,
1988). The term “Situational Awareness bubble” is used commonly to emphasise both the time
and space aspects of SA. Technology leaders were asked to conceptualise the situational
awareness bubble in terms of the situational dependencies that need to be managed by crew and
the discussion centred around the following questions:
How are the operational dependencies organised in time and sequence (e.g. flight
phases)? How do they relate to each other? How should they be organised and
prioritised? How should multiple dimensions be represented in the HMI? How to balance
demand against capacity? How to transfer authority when capacity is limited?
The answers to these questions linking operational dependencies to technological functions led to
the following general observations:
1) The crew should be at the centre of the flight operations process and pilots should
always be the ones to make the final decision on the flight-deck. 2) There is a clear
difference between managing a flight (gate-to-gate) and managing the flight operations
process in terms of both system and stakeholder input and output required. 3) There is a
need for an integrated crew support function on the ACROSS flight deck. 4) The
technology interfaces and functions, considered individually, could not deliver a solution
to crew maintaining the situational awareness bubble. 5) The crew should receive
decision support to manage the tasks of Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, Manage
Systems and Crew Monitoring. This decision support should be in the form of prioritised
recommendations for action. 6) It would be advantageous if the recommendations could
give an idea of what potential consequences of those actions would be.
The general conclusion of the integration meeting was that the technologies, on their own, cannot
deliver an autonomous progressive automation concept, moving from one level of automation to
another according to the level of workload, or an entirely reliable and valid incapacitation
decision leading to automatic recovery of the aircraft. This also implied that the normative model
of workload expressed as a function of demand over capacity (e.g. Fuller, 2000) would not be
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adequate to address the core function of crew as ‘managers of the operation’, including, of
course, being active managers of workload and incapacity.
The Relationship between Technology and Operations
This conclusions begged the question: what is the relationship between advanced technology and
operational performance? Generating an answer to this question was stimulated by a radical
analysis of cognitive HMI by Hourlier and his colleagues which formed the basis of the Thalis
ODICIS cockpit (Hourlier & Suhir, 2014; Lini et al., 2012; Lini, Favier, Servantie, Vallespir, &
Hourlier, 2011). In this framework there are four cognitive HMI principles that enable a rupture
between classical fly-by-wire technologies and the next generation of cognitively enhanced
cockpits. Briefly, these principles suggested the following questions about the ACROSS
technologies:
Schematise: what schematic representations can be supported by technologies that are
critical to the management of workload by crew?
Anticipate: what advanced information can technologies support/provide that support
proactive management of workload?
Delegate: What functions can be delegated (to other crew or technology) through
technologies to support the crew in managing workload?
Routinise: In what way do technologies support management of workload to render them
simple, intuitive, easily learned and reducing overall cognitive training effort?
These cognitive HMI principles tie into the cognitive behavioural cycle of operations that deals
not only with separate technologies but with how these enable the management of concurrent
tasks, taking into account both the past and projections for the future. These principles highlight
what the technology can do for the crew. This then helped to focus the question: what can the
crew do with the technologies?
The ACROSS Workload Management Concept
This approach led to the formulation of a generic workload management concept, as outlined in
Table 1.
Table 1. ACROSS Workload Management concept
Workload Management Concept

Proactive Workload Management

Immediate Workload Management

Reactive Workload Management

Definition
Managing workload using timelines and other schematisations. This
enables anticipation, which in turn enables planning and allocating
resources along the timeline. This enables crew to spread the anticipated
workload better and also to be more prepared and more capable of
absorbing unexpected spikes in workload.
In ACROSS immediate workload management is achieved through the use
of automation, which reduces demand and together with enhanced decision
support reduces crew workload in the here-and-now.
Managing workload by reacting to events/situations after they have
happened. The main focus of reactive workload management in ACROSS
is the Crew Monitoring System, which can detect pilot incapacitation and
suggest mitigations.
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In the final phase of the project this workload concept was tested in a series of workshops
involving operational and human factors experts following a set of operational scenarios
deploying the technologies enbaling a focussed discussion of the operational aspects of
the technologies under the different configurations envisaged by the project (full crew;
one crew member incapacitated; both crew incapacitated).
The following provides a short schematic summary of the core relationships of each mode of
managing workload, based on the analyses of the workshops with key stakeholders. The purpose
of this exercise was to consolidate a model of how the ACROSS technologies could support the
management of peak workload and pilot incapacitation, and to point to some basic issues that
need further examination.
Proactive Workload Management does not stand on its own, it is a precursor to the other modes.
It provides a barrier to peak workload through advanced information in relation to alternate
airports and their characteristics, the weather, frequency changes, overall system status, amongst
other things. This enables crew to, for example, plan and select alternates or to adjust the mission
in the light of system status. It reinforces current crew roles and could have a strong input to
crew briefing. The outcome is to spread workload more evenly and to ensure crew a both
prepared for things that are foreseen, and ready to tackle unforeseen demands.
Immediate Workload Management operates through reducing demand in a number of ways:
providing specific information to assist decision-making, actuation of decisions by use of
automation, new HMI design which co-locates system status and action actuation, and
interaction design which supports a check process. These barriers to escalating workload in turn
support a number of mechanisms: making a decision (selecting nearest airport, for example),
deploying automated systems, going through fault identification and rectification sequences that
manage the systems’ status. Again these mechanisms reinforce both crew roles. The outcome is
easier and less demanding decisions, delegating tasks to automation, including automated checks
on system status. The objective is an optimal division of labour in a highly demanding situation.
Reactive Workload Management in Single Crew Incapacitation involves the key barriers of
monitoring information about the crew and about the aircraft operational status. These are also
accompanied by all the other technologies we have just described in the previous two paragraphs
– both information and actuation. The monitoring information enables on-going monitoring and
decision-making, but the other technologies are crucial in reducing the demand on the remaining
pilot in continuing the operation (for example in automated go-around). The focus here is on
consolidating both crew roles in one pilot, though some of the experts referred to some
automated functions as a potential co-pilot. A big question that arose in the workshop
discussions concerned the sharing of information with ATC and Flight Operations Control. The
outcome here is reasserting effective control over the operation, with some questions about the
type of support that could be received from the ground.
Reactive Workload Management when all crew are incapacitated involves the critical barriers of
constant crew monitoring, together with the availability of emergency support systems for the
aircraft controlling all the automation options that can return the aircraft safely to the ground.
The mechanisms centers around a clear signal that initiates transfer of control to the emergency
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support systems. This then potentiates functions like automated navigation and landing. The
Ground Station is in strategic control. Again the question was raised about the level of sharing
cockpit information with the Ground Station and ATC. The outcome is a safe landing. An issue
that arose concerned the responsibility and capability of the ground support to deal effectively
with any malfunction of the emergency support systems.
Conclusions
Two things stand out from this analysis:
Firstly, the Proactive and Immediate Workload management modes both reinforce the current
crew configuration and their roles which make sense in terms of optimizing all resources in
managing a demanding situation. On the other hand crew incapacitation involves transforming
those roles – consolidating in one crew or transferring to an automated pilot and ground control.
Thus many of the same technologies are supporting quite contrasting instantiation of crew roles.
Secondly, while the Proactive and Immediate modes support the independence of the crew in
their cockpit, both reactive modes pose questions about the information flow between the cockpit
and ground control, and in turn about the level of support or, in the final mode, effective
intervention, that could be provided from the ground. These issues are not just about the flow of
information but about responsibility and accountability.
The ‘Crew manage the operation’ concept has provided a unifying framework through which it is
possible to see the combined role of these diverse technologies in a crew-centric way. It has
enabled the exploration of the role of advanced technologies, and most particularly the ‘rupture’
in technology development that is typified by the ACROSS technologies which bring both rich
meaningful content and dramatically expanded connectivity.
However that rupture demonstrates the need to rethink the philosophy of automation. In referring
to Tarnovsky (2002), the question is raised whether or not this is still an authoritative comment
on automation philosophy in the light of the cockpit technologies represented in ACROSS.
Simplistic thinking along the lines of classic automation is no longer sufficient – it is not just a
question of replacing one function after another with an automated system until one gets rid of a
crew-member. The implications of technological step changes must be addressed in depth.
Trust in technology is core to trust in the future system. Some confidence was placed in this
during the workshops – with use, people will learn to trust the new technology and exploit the
functional benefits it brings. However single crew operation is for many a threatening concept
viewed with great suspicion if not hostility. Crew monitoring raised questions about how future
systems would “handle” data associated with crew and fatigue. There must be clear guidelines
for data protection whilst ensuring safe practice for crew. The dynamics of system
transformation by new technology is not a deterministic process and there are real choices to be
made about the relative role of people and technologies. These choices need to be made in an
informed way.
All of this will require new procedures and new training to capture reinforce the optimal
relationships between new technology and operations and how to cope when the technology
fails.
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A new paradigm for system integration has emerged with new flight deck technologies together
with the SESAR and Next-Gen mega-projects; however this has yet has to generate a new
operational paradigm. The issues can no longer be resolved on the flight deck or at the
controller’s workstation - they increasingly concern the relationship between flight deck and
ground control (both airline and ATC). It is not just the technology interface with the human that
is important but the connectivity to the rest of the system. Because of this complexity the driving
operational concept should be clearly embedded in a rich understanding of operational reality.
This involves a capability for ‘System Design for Operations’ (McDonald, Morrison and
Grommes, 2007). The development of new technologies pushes us further to consider not just the
transformation of roles at local level where new automation can enhance human functioning as
well as supplanting it; it forces us to consider how relationships are transformed across the
system and it puts clearly on the agenda the requirements for effective and accountable
governance of the next generation of operational systems
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